Why do monetary policies matter? : An experimental study of saving and inflation in an overlapping generations model by Bernasconi, Michele & Kirchkamp, Oliver
Why do monetary policies matter?
An experimental study of saving and inflation in an
overlapping generations model
Michele Bernasconi
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali — Universita` di Napoli †
Oliver Kirchkamp
SFB 504 — Universita¨t Mannheim ‡
November 1999
Abstract
We study experiments of an overlapping generations model where inflation is
determined by the monetary policy and by the amount of average saving within each
period.
We use a new experimental setup that allows us to observe more details of the
process of expectation forming and separate this process from the actual saving pro-
cess.
In contrast to experimental findings by Lim, Prescott, Sunder; Marimon, Spear,
Sunder; and Marimon, Sunder we find that (1) agents do not form first-order adap-
tive expectations; (2) subjects ‘over-save’ for precautionary reasons; as a result (3)
the so-called Friedman conjecture holds, i.e. monetary policies which are equiva-
lent in static equilibrium exhibit different levels and different volatility of inflation
in the experiment. This may generate important policy trade-offs between monetary
regimes. We discuss our findings and relate them to current research on adaptive
learning and the role it may have in ranking alternative monetary policies.
Keywords: OLG-model, expectations, inflation, stability, monetary policy, ex-
periments.
JEL-Classification: C92,E21,E31,E52
 
A demo page of the experiment can be found at: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/  kirchkamp
/noi.html.
We thank the Italian CNR and MURST and the German DFG (SFB 504) for funding the project. The
project started when both authors were Jean Monnet Fellows at the European University Institute (Florence)
where some of the experiments described in this paper were conducted. We thank the Institute for its
hospitality and for assistance in running the experiments. We also thank and acknowledge the hospitality
of the laboratories of the SFB 504 of the University of Mannheim and of the faculty of economics at the
University of Pavia where further experiments were done. We thank Carluccio Bianchi, Martin Hellwig,
Simon Hug, Tullio Jappelli, Ramon Marimon, Stephen Spear, Amy Verdun, and several seminar participants
for helpful discussions.
†Via Cintia 26, Complesso Monte Sant’Angelo; I-80126 Napoli; bernasco@unipv.it
‡L 13, 15; D-63131 Mannheim; Phone +49-621-181-3447; Fax: +49-621-181-3451;
oliver@kirchkamp.de
1
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
The inflationary impact of monetary policy is a classic theme in macroeconomics, which
has long been investigated through theory and econometric studies. More recently it has
also been the focus of an interesting series of experiments. Following the resurgence of
interest of macroeconomists for theories of adaptive learning (see Evans and Honkapohja
(1999), for a thorough review), Lim, Prescott and Sunder (1994), Marimon and Sunder
(1993, 1994, 1995) and Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993), all ran experiments to investi-
gate whether the inflationary processes in overlapping generation economies (OLG) with
multiple equilibria would be better explained by adaptive expectations or by the rational
expectations hypothesis.
In the setting underlying the experiments, which closely mimics an OLG model stud-
ied theoretically by Sargent and Wallace (1987), Marcet and Sargent (1989), Bruno and
Fisher (1990), monetary policy is public knowledge and subjects use money as a unique
asset to transfer wealth across two periods. The model displays a well-known indeter-
minacy problem1: under any monetary policy, the economy has two stationary rational
expectation solutions — a low (classical) inflation stationary state (ISS) and a high ISS
— and a continuum of non-stationary rational expectations equilibria which reach the
high ISS in the long run. On the other hand, stability of the ‘adaptive dynamics’ implies
convergence towards the low ISS under a large class of adaptive learning rules and for a
large set of initial conditions.
The inflation paths observed in a first wave of experiments (e.g. Marimon and Sunder
(1993, 1994)) documented wide convergence towards the stationary equilibrium with low
inflation, giving substantial support to adaptive learning as a valuable theory of equilib-
rium selection.
Later, Marimon and Sunder (1995) in the same experimental setting compared the
inflationary impacts of two classical monetary regimes.
Under the first regime, which Marimon and Sunder call the ‘real deficit rule’, the gov-
ernment fixes a constant level of real deficit and finances it through seigniorage (though
government expenditure does not enter into agents’ utilities). Such a rule may yield high
inflation in some periods and low inflation in others. Under the second regime, called the
‘money growth rule’, the government fixes the rate of growth of the money supply and
adjusts the level of seigniorage to satisfy its money growth rule. This rule may lead to a
high government deficit in some periods and to a small one in others.
Although the two regimes correspond to different fiscal environments, in Marimon
and Sunder’s (1995) experiment the two rules were fixed so as to share the same steady
state equilibrium and also to yield, in equilibrium, the same government revenue. The
goal of the investigation was to test a classical conjecture, first suggested by Friedman
(1948, 1960), that to stabilise inflation, a simple rule, such as constant growth of the
money supply, may be better because it can more easily be learned, making it easier for
agents to co-ordinate their behaviour.
Marimon and Sunder (1995) found weak support for this conjecture: price volatility
observed in their experiments, rather than by differences in the monetary regimes is better
1The model is an OLG version of Cagan’s model of hyper-inflation (Cagan 1956).
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explained by the stability properties of the adaptive learning rules which subjects seemed
to adopt. They specifically found support for first-order adaptive expectations and showed
theoretically that first-order adaptive expectations imply equivalence of the volatility of
inflation under the two rules.
Here we submit Friedman’s conjecture to further scrutiny, using an experimental set-
up that allows us to observe more details of subjects’ behaviour and to study the process of
expectations formation independently of that of actual saving decisions. We further try to
make sure that subjects easily understand what is going on in their economy. We find that
the two monetary rules are no longer equivalent, but differ significantly in terms of both
the level and the volatility of inflation. Since we can observe more details of the subjects’
decision-making process, we can relate the changes in the macroeconomic properties to
changes in the microeconomic behaviours.
Different setups to model an OLG economy in an experiment are reported in the liter-
ature. Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) introduced a very straightforward procedure to
assist subjects to make their optimal saving decisions. This procedure was later also used
by Marimon and Sunder (1995): subjects are asked to make one inflation forecast for one
period ahead (knowing past realized inflation), and then the computer software automat-
ically computes and implements subjects’ optimal saving, given that unique forecast and
treating it as if it were certain2.
Individuals, however, may have reasons for deviating from this certainty equivalent
behaviour and, more generally, from strict optimisation. Firstly, there is the possibility
that agents do not hold point expectations, and react to the volatility of inflation with pre-
cautionary saving. Secondly, rather than proceeding to individual maximisation, agents
may to some extent copy others believed to be better equipped to make good decisions.
Thirdly, various other factors like inertia, small transactions costs (also interpreted in psy-
chological terms), rules of thumb, may generate small deviations from optimality 3.
We therefore made a few changes in designing our experimental set-up, which we
considered important for understanding better the forces which may drive the inflationary
processes of the two monetary rules. Let us emphasise three of these changes. Firstly,
in our network economy subjects make both forecasts, receiving from the computer a
suggestion for optimal saving, but then making their actual saving decisions. In this way,
we can analyse whether and how actual differ from optimal decisions. Second, we do not
restrict our subjects to hold quasi-point forecasts: our subjects can check the implication
2This procedure was also introduced to reduce part of the noise observed in earlier experiments with
more elaborate setups. Lim, Prescott, Sunder (1994), for example, used oral double auctions to determine
exchange rates in each period. It turned out that even with auctions lasting for five minutes in each single
period markets did not clear. Later, they, and also Marimon and Sunder (1993), asked subjects to send a
supply schedule to a walrasian auctioneer who then determined market clearing prices. This solved the
problem of markets not being cleared, but still led to rather noisy prices. The noise was clearly reduced
by the more direct optimality procedure used by Marimon and Sunder (1995). It is however worthwhile
anticipating that, together with the noise, they also eliminated a considerable amount of saving above the
optimum, i.e. over-saving, observed in their earlier experiments, which, as we shall emphasise throughout
this paper, affect quite differently the inflationary processes of the two monetary regimes under study.
3All these effects may in particular be important under adaptive expectations, under which the actual law
of motion of the economic systems typically differs, during the transitional process towards an equilibrium,
from the law of motion as perceived by economic agents.
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of many forecasts for various periods ahead before making a final saving decision. This
allows us to distinguish subjects whose forecasts in a given period vary little from others
whose forecasts vary more and may perhaps generate higher savings. Third, in a further
attempt to make our experimental environment descriptively richer, we introduce labels
for monetary policies and make participants vote for monetary policies.
We alternately place the ‘real deficit rule’ and the ‘money growth rule’ under two dif-
ferent labels: we present to our subjects the experimental market as a market operating in
the European Monetary Union; and we propose the two rules as implemented either by the
Bundesbank or by the EU Commission. Besides making the experimental environment
more interesting, and hence accativating the attention of the participants, our hypothesis
was that labels could themselves affect subjects’ expectations and the volatility of the
inflation under the two rules. We conjectured that the ‘Bundesbank label’ might gener-
ate less inflation volatility than the ‘EU Commission label’; but we find little support for
this4.
Anticipating briefly our results, regardless of the effect of labels, we first of all note
that, like our precursors, we find convergence to the low ISS in most of our experimental
economies. The actual transition dynamics, however, that we find around the low ISS
equilibria are much more complex under both regimes and for all of our experimental
economies than can be approximated by a first-order or by any other simple adaptive
scheme. In particular, we find that the inflation rates under the real deficit regime are, on
the average, lower than the inflation equilibrium levels and also than the average inflation
rates observed under the revenue equivalent money growth rule; in support of Friedman’s
conjecture, the price is a greater inflation volatility under the real deficit regime than under
the money growth rule.
The evidence we can explain with the characteristics of the saving decision processes
which our subjects seem to follow. First of all, we find that actual saving rates differ
significantly from the optimal saving decisions implied by individual forecasts: the latter
enter in explanation of the former together with past average saving rates, in a convex
combination which explains our findings rather well. Most importantly, we also find a
significant amount of over-saving at individual and aggregate level, probably due to a
form of precautionary saving: since the payoff functions given to our subjects imply that
savings should increase to a mean preserving spread in the expected rate of inflation, and
since with our setup we can measure the variance of individual forecasts, we find that
uncertainty about the future (shown by forecasts with greater variance) explains over-
saving as precautionary saving.
Over-saving is important because it is at the root of the trade-off between the two
regimes implied by our findings. In particular, we will show that only under the real
deficit regime increasing average saving rates yield decreasing inflation rates; but we will
also show that stability of adaptive learning near the low ISS is negatively related to the
inflation rates.
While from one perspective our findings seem to support Friedman’s conjecture on
the comparison between the two regimes, it must however be noted that from a different
4The rationale for the conjecture follows from some recent work on the theory of equilibrium selection
in games, which emphasises the effect that ‘labelling’ and ‘framing’ (see e.g. Sugden (1995) and references
quoted there) may have in helping agents to find their way towards an equilibrium.
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perspective they contrast with another hypothesis also advanced by Friedman in his Nobel
lecture (Friedman 1977). There he suggested that a positive relation exists between the
level of inflation and its volatility. Despite the fact that this second conjecture was formu-
lated in a context of uncertainty of monetary regimes, rather than comparison of regimes,
the policy trade-off is quite interesting; and we will discuss the issue commenting the
results.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we briefly review the theo-
retical OLG model which we investigate. In section 3, we specify the changes introduced
in our experimental setup from previous studies and will give reasons for them. Details
of the experiments we run in Florence (Italy), Mannheim (Germany) and Pavia (Italy) are
given in section 4; the results and their implications in sections 5 and 6. A brief final
section (Section 7) relates our findings to current research on models of adaptive learning
and the role the latter may in general have in ranking monetary policies.
2 A theoretical OLG model of saving, inflation and mon-
etary policies
We study a standard OLG model, in which fiat money is the only financial asset and
government revenue is created through seigniorage. Each generation consists of n agents
and each agent of each generation lives for two periods. We call the first of these periods
the ‘entry’ and the second, the ‘exit’ period. We use superscripts 1 and 2 to distinguish
these two periods. An agent who enters in period t will be called an agent of generation t
and has a two-period endowment of a unique perishable good

ω1  ω2  with ω1  ω2  0.
The agents’ preferences over consumption c1t and c2t in the two periods are represented by
the utility function
u

c1t
 c2t
 :  c1t c
2
t  (1)
Given a sequence of prices for the consumption good  pt 	 t , each agent of generation t
solves the problem:
max
c1t 
 c
2
t
u

c1t
 c2t
 (2)
s.t. pt 

c1t  ω
1
 pt  1 

c2t  ω
2
 0 (3)
Thus, if the agent knew today’s and tomorrow’s price he would best save:
st 
1
2
ω1

pt  1
pt
ω2 (4)
But, he does not know them. Assuming, however, that all the uncertainty of the agent
reduces to hold a well defined price ratio expectation piet  1  Et  1

pt  1  pt  , and that the
agent deals with this expectation as if it were certain, a general hypothesis sometimes
called of certainty equivalent behaviour (see, e.g. Romer (1995, p. 246)), the optimal
saving decision becomes
st 
1
2
ω1

piet  1ω
2 (5)
2 A THEORETICAL OLG MODEL. . . 5
The equilibrium price for any period t is such that the per capita aggregate supply st equals
the per capita aggregate (real) money supply mt :
st  mt (6)
The per capita aggregate money supply mt depends on the monetary regime. We con-
sider two regimes. Under the first, the ‘real deficit’ regime, the political authority fixes
a constant per capita level of real deficit d and finances it through seigniorage; under the
second, the ‘money growth’ regime, the monetary authority allows money to grow by a
constant factor of µ and adjusts the level of seigniorage to satisfy the monetary target. In
neither model considered here are the seigniorage proceeds returned to consumers. By
setting µ  1 when d  0 and d  0 when µ  1, both regimes can be represented by the
following equation:
mt  µmt  1
pt  1
pt
 d (7)
The real deficit regime, which has been studied experimentally by Marimon and Sunder
(1993, 1994), corresponds closely to Cagan’s model of hyper-inflation (Cagan 1956);
whereas the money growth regime, experimentally compared with the first by Marimon
and Sunder (1995), implements Friedman’s rule of a constant growth of the money supply.
Although the two regimes describe different monetary-fiscal environments, they may
have the same steady state equilibrium. To see this, following Marimon and Sunder (1995,
p. 118), equations 5 to 7 give the equilibrium map:
Φ

piet  1
 piet
 pit

 0 (8)
i.e.
piet  1 

b

ed  µb  pi
e
t
pit
 0 (9)
where pit  pt  pt  1, b  ω1  ω2 and e  2  ω2. Given that, for piet  b, ∂3Φ





piet 
b 

pi2t  0, actual inflation can be expressed as a function of expected inflation for the
current and the following period:
pit  µ
b

piet
b

piet  1  ed
(10)
Equation 10 describes the actual law of motion of pit , given expectations and the monetary
regime. Assuming the rational expectations hypothesis piet  pit , it coincides with the
equilibrium dynamics of the economy pit  1  R  µ


d 

pit
 :
pit  1 

b  µ

ed 

µ
b
pit
(11)
For

b

ed  µ  2  4µb, there are two solutions satisfying the stationary condition
Φ

piet  1
 piet
 pit

 0.5 Under the money growth rule, i.e. when d  0 and µ  1, the two
are given by piL  µ and piH  b, where, for µ  b, piL identifies the low ISS (inflation
stationary state), and piH defines the high ISS.
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(From Marimon and Sunder, 1995, p. 120)
Figure 1: Two R  µ


d  maps sharing the same low ISS
Figure 1, from Marimon and Sunder (1995, p. 120), shows two R  µ


d 


 maps con-
structed from such a system of parameter values. The figure may help to understand some
stability properties of the rational expectations equilibria.
The dotted line shows pit  1

pit

 pit . The two hyperbolas represent the mapping from
pit to pit  1 for the two different monetary regimes. Assume that

b

ed  µ  2  4µb,
thus, we have two stationary solutions. Clearly, starting from an initial inflation rate
pi0 8

piL  piH  , the rational expectations dynamic will end at pit 9 piH in the long run.
This, however, is only necessarily the case for rational expectations. In recent years sev-
eral authors have analysed and suggested different adaptive learning rules as selection
procedures in models with multiple rational expectation equilibria. Very much in the
tradition of Cagan (1956) and Friedman (1957), the hypothesis of adaptive learning es-
sentially is that economic agents form and coordinate their beliefs by adjusting adaptively
to past experience. This adaptive adjustment can of course operate on parameters of the
model as well as on realizations, like prices, inflation or average saving levels. We fo-
cus here on adaptive learning of realizations, i.e. inflation or average saving levels. For
example, first-order adaptive learning of inflation can be expressed as follows:
piet  1  pi
e
t
 αt 

pit  1

piet
 (12)
In the context of the present OLG model, a large class of adaptive learning algorithms
(encompassed by the first-order adaptive scheme) will for a large class of initial condi-
5For the case ω2 : 0 we have b : ∞ and only one stationary solution pi ; µω1 <>= ω1 ? 2d @ .
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tions converge on the low ISS 6 (see e.g. Marcet and Sargent (1989), Marimon and Sunder
(1995), Evans, Honkapohja and Marimon (1996). See also review and references in Sar-
gent (1993) and Marimon (1997)). This convergence 7 has important policy implications.
There is the ‘high inflation trap’ (Bruno and Fisher (1990)): the existence of the dual
equilibria — a reflection of the so-called ‘bad Laffer curve in the inflation tax rate’ —
means that an economy may be stuck in the high inflationary equilibria, when with the
same fiscal policy it could be at a lower, Pareto-optimal, inflation rate. In addition, the
comparative dynamics of the two equilibria moves in the opposite directions: in particular
(see equation 10), only under the low inflation equilibrium can the ‘classical’ prescription
to reduce deficit in order to stabilise prices be recommended; under the high inflation-
ary equilibrium, a permanent decrease in d causes the inflation rate to rise because the
economy is on the wrong side of the Laffer curve. In this respect, adaptive learning (with
convergence to the low inflation equilibrium as a consequence) supports the ‘classical’
policy prescription.
On the other hand, when we ask which monetary regime might better stabilise infla-
tion, the adaptive learning hypothesis per se is not very selective. To see this (see also
Marimon and Sunder (1995, p. 122)), simply substitute equation 10 into equation 12,
linearise at piL, and re-write pieτ  piL  δτ, to obtain
δt  1 

piL


1

α 

piL
 δt 
piLαµ


ω1 

piL
 δt  1  ω2 

µω1  piL

µ  δt  ω2
(13)
which gives us the equilibrium map
δt  1
δt 
1

α 
pi2Lαω2
µω1  piLµω2
piLαω2
 ω1  piLω2
1 0
δt
δt  1 (14)
The eigenvalues of the matrix in 14 describe the stability of the dynamic process. With
complex eigenvalues, the law of motion of the rate of inflation is characterised by cyclic
fluctuations around piL; and stability depends only on the contraction factor:
r

α  
piLαω2
ω1

piLω2
(15)
In particular, the greater the expression, the more likely the system is to be stable 8.
Since, however, the expression does not depend on the parameters of the monetary rule,
6Note, however, that pi : ∞ is also an attractor of the adaptive dynamics under these conditions.
7Despite the convergence, it is however important to appreciate that, contrary to the case of rational
expectations, under adaptive expectations, the actual law of motion of pit , given by equation 10, is no longer
consistent with the perceived law of motion from equation 12. Under this perspective, the assumption of
no-uncertainty underlying the theoretical OLG model may appear even stronger.
8More specifically, the eigenvalues of the matrix in 14 are:
λ1 = α @BA λ2 = α @C; piLαω2
ω1 ? piLω2
λ1 = α @>D λ2 = α @C; = 1 ? α @>D pi
2
Lαω2
µω1 ? piLµω2
If λ = α @ are complex, that is if λ = α @E; x F yi, then whether the system is stable or not depends on whether
= x2 D y2 @G; piLαω2ω1 H piLω2 is greater than or equal to one.
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it follows that, close to the low inflation equilibrium, the two rules share the same sta-
bility properties. Thus, somewhat paradoxically against Friedman’s conjecture, under
first-order adaptive learning neither regime can be preferred to the other.
The series of experiments conducted by Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994, 1995) give
substantial support to the first-order adaptive learning and to the corollaries mentioned
above. In the rest of the paper we describe our experimental set-up, how it differs from
our precursors, and report results not quite conforming with the previous evidence.
3 An experimental setting for OLG models
Preparing an experimental environment for the theoretical models described in the previ-
ous section requires consideration of several complex implementation problems. We have
adapted the general implementation strategy of our precursors, which was based on the
following basic design.
3.1 The experimental environment
A typical experimental environment simulates a very simple market. In the market, sub-
jects can buy and sell a commodity that we call chips in a sequence of market periods.
There is a fixed number (N) of participants and, for each market period, each participant
has a specific role: n subjects enter the market and act as young consumers; n act as old
consumers and leave the market at the end of the period; the remaining N

2n stay out-
side and await their turn to enter as young consumers. A young consumer in one period
becomes an old consumer in the next.
When young consumers enter the market, they receive their ω1 endowment of chips.
They may consume (‘eat’) some of these chips instantly (in the amount c1) and sell the
remaining chips to old consumers and to the government (in the quantity S  ω1

c1).
In return for the chips they sell they receive experimental money, which is saved for their
old age in the next period. In old age consumers ‘eat’ a total number of chips given by
c2  ω2  Spt  pt  1.
The number of chips ‘eaten’ in both the entry and the exit periods, c1 and c2 respec-
tively, determines the payoff in Italian Lire or German Marks for participating in the
market, according to a linear transformation λ

c1

c2

κ. Subjects learn their payoff in
local currency from the current round immediately after the market clears.
Subjects enter and leave the market more than once during an experimental session
and their payoff for each market participation accumulates (the total is paid at the end of
the experiment). When, however, a subject re-enters the market it is not possible to access
the account accumulated from previous participation: the subject re-enters the market as
a newborn 9.
9In the words of Marimon and Sunder (1993, p. 1076), it is as if “subjects were living several ‘lives’ over
the many periods of a particular economy”. They (Lemma 1, p. 1085) also show that this repeated participa-
tion does not cause departure from the OLG model, in the sense that if strategic behaviours (in violation of
the competitive assumption underlying the theoretical OLG model) arise at all in the experimental market,
this is due to the fewness of the subjects and not to the repeated participation per se. On the contrary, the
repeated entry of the same subjects into the economy can be particularly useful to study how learning and
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3.2 A WWW Interface for the experiment
In our experimental design, market transactions between agents are administered by a
networked software program accessed by a WWW-Browser. Figure 2 shows the typical
interface for the experiment. The main task subjects have to perform (see top half of the
figure) is a saving decision when they are young consumers, i.e. in their entry periods.
Subjects are also asked to make a saving recommendation in periods when they are old
or outside the market. To do that they use the same interface they use otherwise for saving
decisions when they are young. The only difference is that they are told that payoffs from
saving recommendations (on the gray background in the ‘History’ table of the figure) do
not count for the final payoff. Subjects are told that they may benefit from giving serious
consideration to saving recommendations while learning and practising with the software
and with the economy. As it turns out, the behaviour of ‘old’ or ‘idle’ subjects is very
similar to that of ‘young’ subjects.
3.2.1 The chips supply and demand, and the monetary regimes
In each market period, the individual savings of only the young agents are added by the
computer to determine the goods supply.
The aggregate money supply is given by the sum of the real cash balance in the hands
of the old plus the demand for chips for public expenditure (which, consistently with
the theoretical model, does not enter into the subjects’ payoff functions). Under the real
deficit regime, this residual public expenditure is given by d chips per head bought in each
period at the market clearing price; whereas under the money growth regime the public
demand is adjusted for growth in the amount of money in circulation at a constant factor
of µ in each period.
Which of the two regimes is in force is determined at the beginning of each exper-
imental session by election. Subjects are told that they will participate in a simulated
market operating in the EMU and are informed about the two monetary regimes. The
mapping of the two regimes to labels that describe the central bank which controls the
monetary policy is fixed for each experiment. Labels may either be EU-Commission
for one monetary regime and Bundesbank10 for the other or two neutral labels ‘red’ and
‘blue’ for the two regimes. Before making any saving decisions subjects are asked to vote
for a regime. In some sections the election determines the monetary regime. In some
sessions the regime is predetermined. Subjects know this, though they do not know in
which session the regime is predetermined.
The market clearing price is determined in each period by the computer program as
the residual between goods supply and money supply. The resulting allocations, the rate
of inflation and the average saving in the economy are displayed in the ‘History’ table on
the computer screen (figure 2).
With no announcement in advance, at the end of some period of the experimental
session participants are informed which was the last period of the session. Chips ‘eaten’
experience may affect subjects’ decisions, because if it is true that “assets cannot be carried from one ‘life’
to the next, but memory and experience obviously are” (Marimon and Sunder (1993, p. 1076)).
10In Florence we used EU-Commission and EURO-Bank as labels, pointing out that the EURO-Bank
would be particularly independent, similar to the Bundesbank.
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Session 1 — History
Periods: 1 2 3
Inflation: 42.9 82.9 104.2
Av. Saving: 292 266 217
Best Saving: 230 190
Your Saving: 353 235 190
Your Payoff: 950 Total: 950
Your saving decision:
You enter the market in period 4. How much
do you want to save?
chips Ok .
Inflation %
time
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
0
50
100
IJ
IJ
IJ
IJ
IJ
IJ
Average Saving (Chips)
time
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
100
200
300 KL
KL
KL
KL
KL
KL
+
+ +
+ +
Clear Forecasts
Session 1 — Your Forecasts
Periods: 4 5 6
Inflation: 99.2 89.2 77.9
Av. Saving: 181 160 150
Best Saving 220 230
A demo of the experiment may be accessed at http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/ex/register.
Figure 2: The terminal interface
or saved in the last period by young consumers have no value.
3.2.2 A specialised calculator
Apart from the novelty and easy accessibility of the www interface, the main innovation
in our experiment is a ‘specialised calculator’ to assist subjects in their saving decisions.
The calculator consists of two diagrams, one for inflation and one for average saving, and
a table (see the bottom part of the computer screen of figure 2). Whenever they wished,
subjects could make forecasts for either the rate of inflation or for average saving by
directly clicking in either diagram at that level of inflation or of average saving forecast
for a given period. Depending on the forecast, the program computes the saving decision
which maximises the payoff and displays the result in the table. Subjects may then decide
to use the suggested saving decision; they may change their forecast to obtain a new
saving suggestion; they may also explore the future, making forecasts for several periods
ahead; or they may disregard the suggestions of the computer and make whichever saving
decision they wish.
In contrast to this setup, most previous experiments have not separated the process
of expectations formation from that of actual saving decisions. For example, in Mari-
mon and Sunder (1995) subjects were asked to submit a unique inflation forecast in each
market period, which was then used by the computer to determine automatically the in-
dividual optimal saving. While this procedure adheres more strictly to the theoretical
model outlined in the previous section, since it directly imposes the assumption of cer-
tainty equivalent on subjects’ behaviour, it may however be inconsistent with the way
people actually make their saving decisions. With our approach, we particularly wanted
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Parameters Low ISS High ISS Eigenvalues Contraction
Regime d

ω1 µ sL  ω1 piL sL  ω1 piH λ

1  λ


5  r

1  r


5 
Money growth 0 2.27 .31 2.27 0 6 .31 M

72i .40 M

39i .78 .55
Real deficit .17 0 .31 2.27 .28 2.63 .69 M

36i .37; .83 .78 -
Table 1: Parameters and inflation and saving levels
to investigate two possible ways of deviating from the hypothesis of certainty equivalent.
First, in order to address the difficult problem they are facing, some subjects, rather than
making expectations, may simply find it easier to follow what they expect other people
are doing, looking perhaps at what others have done in the past. In this case we might
expect more inertia in saving behaviours than that implied by strict maximisation. Sec-
ond, even if subjects do actually have expectations, they may not necessarily hold point
expectations. They may reason in terms of an interval of possible expectation values and
hence react to the relative uncertainty with precautionary savings. As it turns out, both
types of behaviour are well documented in our results; and, as we shall see, they have
important implications for the inflationary impact of the two monetary regimes.
4 Experiments in Florence, Mannheim and Pavia
With 13 groups of subjects, involving a total of 204 participants, we carried out 41 differ-
ent experimental economies in Florence (Italy), Mannheim (Germany) and Pavia (Italy).
Participants in Florence were Ph.D. students, most of them in Economics; in Mannheim
they were undergraduates from faculties like engineering, social sciences and business
administration; in Pavia they were undergraduates, mostly studying economics.
In all three places we tried to implement as many combinations of parameters as possi-
ble. In each place we studied economies which differed with respect to monetary regimes
and labels. We also varied the number of periods played in each session (in particular
to avoid an end-game effect) and the nominal initial endowment ω1 (to make communi-
cation among different groups of subjects more difficult). For the two regimes we study,
Table 1 summarises the equilibrium values implied by the parameters we choose. (A more
detailed list of the experiments is given in appendix A).
These values accomplish two specific objectives we had in mind when we decided
to conduct the experiments. Firstly, consistent with the theoretical model of section 2,
the two regimes are fully comparable in the sense that they both have the same low ISS
inflation rate (piL  2

27414) and the same saving rate (sL  0

310488

ω1); they allow
collection of the same government revenue (0

173958

ω1) (though they of course dif-
fer in the high ISS), and they share, under first-order adaptive expectations (i.e. with α
close to one), the same stability properties (r  1   0  78). Secondly, in order to facilitate
comparison, our experimental economies are very similar to those in the literature, in par-
ticular in Marimon and Sunder (1995); though none of the previously studied economies
was exactly equivalent in terms of both low steady states and stability properties of the
two monetary rules11.
11As a further objective, we wanted to have a ‘challenging’ setup, in the sense that we wanted high
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In the following section we present the results mechanically, leaving their discussion
to a subsequent section. We do it in four steps: we start from the macro evidence, look-
ing firstly at the average levels of inflation and saving, and secondly at the volatility of
the economies; we move then to micro behaviours, beginning from the process of ex-
pectations formation, to conclude with the analysis of the actual saving decisions. The
presentation of the results will refer to values which are normalised relative to the low
ISS: inflation piL is normalised to 100 and saving sL is normalised to 1. Thus the high
ISS is piH  116  s  0

902 under the constant real deficit rule and piH  263  s  0 under
the constant money growth rule. We give here a compact version of the results; a more
detailed analysis can be found in Bernasconi and Kirchkamp, (1998), with a full account
of the whole experimental procedure, including instructions and details of introductory
experimental sessions.
5 Results
5.1 The macro evidence
5.1.1 The amount of inflation and saving
It is well established (Marimon and Sunder 1993, Marimon and Sunder 1994, Mari-
mon and Sunder 1995) that in this setup subjects converge closely to the low-inflation-
equilibrium. Figure 3 shows the distributions of inflation and average saving levels in all
our experiments which confirm this finding: both distributions settle around the low ISS
equilibrium. Neither of the two, however, is symmetrically centered around the equilib-
rium values: the distribution of saving lean towards higher values and that of inflation
towards lower values.
Figure 4, illustrating how the levels of inflation and saving develop over time in all
our experimental economies, shows that the two biases do not depend on the evolution of
the economies over time: average saving is somewhat greater than the equilibrium value
and inflation is lower throughout all periods. (In the figure, boxes denote 25%, 50% and
75% quartiles, the upper whisker stretches to the highest data point that is still smaller
than the 75% quartile, plus 1.5 times the difference between the 75% quartile and the
25% quartile. The lower whisker is constructed accordingly. Points outside the whisker
are marked by circles).
To start to analyse which factors, among those we varied through the experiments,
might have caused the above-mentioned departures from equilibrium values, Figures 5
and 6 illustrate how the levels of inflation and saving vary with places, monetary rules,
and labels attached to monetary rules. The pictorial evidence confirms what we also
inflation and equilibria close together. Thus, while there is an upper border for the low ISS piL N ω1 < ω2
(as long as there is an equivalent real deficit rule) we attempted to approach this border closely. In view
of that, we have chosen ω1 < ω2 ; 6 (to be consistent with most of the previous experiments), and d ;
167 < 160 A ω2. These values almost mark an upper boundary: d ; = ω1 < ω2 ? 1 @ 2 < 2 O 168 P 082 < 160 A ω2
turns out to be the highest sustainable deficit. (The slightly higher value d ; 168 < 160 A ω2 we might have
chosen, would give the focal number (piL ; 5 < 2), which subjects could choose in the experiment because
it’s focal, and not because is an equilibrium).
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The left diagram shows inflation, the right one shows saving for all experiments.
Figure 3: Distribution of inflation and average saving levels
The left diagram shows inflation, the right one shows saving for all experiments.
Figure 4: Development of inflation and saving over time
5 RESULTS 14
Figure 5: Inflation depending on place, monetary rule, and label.
Figure 6: Saving depending on place, monetary rule and label.
tested from OLS regressions (available in our working paper Bernasconi and Kirchkamp
(1998)). While we find no significant or systematic difference in the results depending
on the places or on the labels, we find a significant and persistent effect in all places
and under all labels for the monetary rules: the constant real deficit regime leads to less
inflation and greater average saving than the constant money growth regime.
5.1.2 Inflation volatility and Friedman’s conjecture
The central question underlying the experimental comparison of the two monetary
regimes was to investigate Friedman’s conjecture (1948, 1960) that a constant growth of
the money supply stabilises inflation better than a constant real deficit rule, when the two
regimes yield the same government revenues. To investigate this conjecture, we look at
three different measures for volatility: two objective, an absolute one (νoa  ln Q pit

pit  1 Q )
and a relative one (νor  ln ln2

pit  pit  1
 ); and one subjective, νs  ln

σ

pie 

pie  , where
σ

pie  denotes the standard deviation of a subject’s inflation forecasts and pie the mean of
these forecasts. In all cases we take logs to reduce skewness. The cumulative distributions
are shown for the two regimes in figure 7.
The use of a subjective measure, i.e. a measure of how volatility is perceived by the
single individual, is specifically new and is only permitted by the novelty of our exper-
imental approach. Since we are able to observe several forecasts by an individual for a
given period, we can calculate the variance of the individual’s forecasts for the period.
If these forecasts are centered very closely around a single level, the individual might be
feeling in a relatively stable situation. If, however, forecasts are scattered over a large in-
terval, the individual is apparently less certain about the situation of the economy, which
we interpret as the perception of a more volatile situation.
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of different measures of volatility of inflation.
We ran several regressions, relating our three measures of inflation volatility to mone-
tary rules, labels, places of the experiments, sessions. Table 2 summarises the regressions.
While we find no significant effect for any other parameter studied, we observe that the
effect of the monetary rule is present in all our experimental economies: specifically, we
find that, regardless which indicator we consider, the constant real deficit rule (coded as
‘deficit’ in the table) always leads to more inflation volatility than the constant money
growth rule.
Thus, in contrast to Marimon and Sunder (1995), our evidence apparently gives some
support to Friedman’s conjecture.
5.2 Evidence on micro behaviour
5.2.1 Formation of forecasts
Seeking the reasons for this difference in the results at micro level, we consider the pro-
cess of expectations formation. We recall that with first-order adaptive expectations, and
assuming strict optimisation and no-uncertainty, the constant money growth rule and the
constant real deficit rule exhibit the same volatility as long as we are close to the low ISS.
Marimon and Sunder (1995) found substantial support for first-order adaptive expec-
tations. Here we conduct a simple but direct test, to check whether adaptive learning in
general and first-order adaptive expectations in particular are valid in our environment
too.
We estimate for each period separately the equation:
piet  1  αtpit  1
 βtpiet  ct (16)
where the constant c should be 0 for first-order adaptive learning. (The estimation are
made separately for different periods. Hence the error term cannot be correlated with any
of the pi’s). The development of the coefficients over time is described in Figure 8: c is
not zero, but cycles around some positive value.
Our interpretation is that subjects have some sort of adaptive expectations, though
there seems to be more inertia in subjects’ adaptive learning rules than can be due to
first-order adaptive learning alone.12
12Also Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) found some support for second order schemes. We also tested
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Estimation of objective relative volatility νor  βdeficit  c
νor  ln ln2

pit  pit  1
 β σβ t P  Q t Q 95% conf. interval
All experiments 727 observations
deficit .6200389 .2321794 2.671 0.008 .1642148 1.075863
c -6.344855 .1685217 -37.650 0.000 -6.675704 -6.014006
Estimation of objective absolute volatility νoa  βdeficit  c
νoa  ln Q pit

pit  1 Q β σβ t P  Q t Q 95% conf. interval
All experiments 727 observations
deficit .3094842 .1189526 2.602 0.009 .0759516 .5430168
c 1.405345 .0863388 16.277 0.000 1.235841 1.574849
Estimation of subjective volatility νs  βνorνor  βdeficit  βBuBa  βEC  c
νs β σβ t P  Q t Q 95% conf. interval
All experiments 1808 observations
νor .0948404 .009629 9.849 0.000 .0759552 .1137256
deficit .3779502 .0607352 6.223 0.000 .2588314 .497069
BuBa -.1558654 .0756481 -2.060 0.040 -.3042325 -.0074982
EC -.1727994 .0764621 -2.260 0.024 -.322763 -.0228358
c -2.839546 .0895649 -31.704 0.000 -3.015208 -2.663885
βdeficit is a dummy variable that is one for the constant real deficit rule, βBuBa is a dummy variable that
is one for regimes labeled ‘Bundesbank’, βEC is a dummy variable that is one for regimes labeled ‘EU
Commission’, c is a constant included in the regression.
Table 2: Determinants of objective and subjective volatility
.
αt  RS RS
βt  TU TU
ct  VW VW
Period
Figure 8: Adaptive learning parameters from eq. 16 over time
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 βνorνor from eq. 21
Actual saving can be explained rather well as a convex combination of optimal saving and past saving.
Figure 9: Actual saving versus optimal saving
5.2.2 How forecasts are translated into saving decisions
The important assumption of the theoretical model to which we now direct attention is
that of certainty equivalent behaviour, namely, the hypothesis that individuals implement
their optimal saving decisions given their forecasts, computing the former as if the latter
were certain. Since with our experimental setup subjects first make forecasts, receiving
from the computer a suggestion for an optimal saving decision, but then make their own
choices, we can test this hypothesis. Such a direct test can for example be given by the
regression of actual saving si


t on optimal saving (given the individual forecast) s Xi


t as:
si


t  β  s Xi


t (17)
which yields
si


t β σβ t P  Q t Q 95% conf. interval
s Xi


t 1.015071 .0012107 838.384 0.000 1.012698 1.017445
F1 
 7328β Y 1  154  95 PZ F  0  0000
Under certainty equivalent, β should of course be 1. While the regression shows
that the optimal saving recommendations are clearly important for the individual actual
decisions, the hypothesis of certainty equivalent that only recommendations matter (i.e.
β  1) is clearly rejected (see also graph top left of figure 9).
We now present the result of a search for a specification which can best represent
actual saving. We start running for each player i a regression that explains actual saving
si


t as a linear function of the saving recommendation s Xi


t for this player at the given period
and of past saving st  1
[[
st  n of the last n periods. We ran regressions for different values
of n. For n  4, we obtained:
si


t  βs \


is Xi


t
 βs1


ist  1
 βs2


ist  2
 βs3


ist  3  βs4


ist  4 (18)
Figure 10 shows the cumulative distribution of βs \


i, i.e. of the weight that a player attaches
to the level of optimal saving, given his or her own expectations. We see that most players
put weight less than one on their own optimal saving.
for second order rules, though in our case the results do not improve much on the first order.
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The figure shows the cumulative distribution of the weight on optimal saving βs]_^ i given own expectation.
Figure 10: Weight on optimal saving
si


t β σβ F P  QF Q 95% conf. interval
All Places 6155 observations
sˆi


t 1.010477 .0009998 F1 
 6154β Y 1  109  80 0.0000 1.008517 1.012437
Table 3: Estimation of equation 20
They seem, however, to compensate quite efficiently for a smaller weight they put on
βs \


i. Figure 11 shows for each player the factor for the saving recommendation βs \


i as
well as the weight of the past saving, summarised as βs1  βs2  βs3  βs4. The observa-
tions in the figure can easily be approximated with a straight line: thus, players almost
construct a convex combination βs \  ∑τ βsτ  1, of past saving and their saving recom-
mendations to decide what amount they should really save.
Claiming that weights really add up to one, i.e. ` i : βs \


i
 ∑τ βsτ


i  1, we can construct
saving predictions sˆi


t as follows:
sˆi


t 

1

βs1


i

βs2


i

βs3


i

βs4


i
 s Xi


t
 βs1


ist  1
 βs2


ist  2
 βs3


ist  3  βs4


ist  4 (19)
To check the extent to which predicted saving sˆi


t explains actual saving si


t , we ran a
simple regression:
si


t  βsˆsˆi


t (20)
Results of the estimation are displayed in table 3. We see that the model explains the
individual saving decision nicely (see also the graph in the middle of figure 9). There is,
however, still a small but highly significant amount of over-saving left to explain.
Precautionary saving might be one reason for over-saving. Precautionary saving
should be higher when the subject is more uncertain about the future, which might be
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.
∑τ βsτ


i
βs \


i
The figure shows the sum of weights that agents attribute to past saving βs1 D βs2 D βs3 D βs4 over the
weight agents attribute to optimal saving.
Figure 11: The impact of past saving versus optimal saving
reflected in the volatility of the subject’s forecasts13.
We take the measure ν˙or  νor

¯νor as a proxy for motives to over-save. As defined
above νor  ln ln2

pit  pit  1

. This makes interpretation of the coefficients in the following
equation easier:
si


t  βsˆ


isˆi


t
 βν˙orν˙or (21)
The averages are displayed in table 4, the relation between the predicted and the actual
values is displayed in the right graph of figure 9. The factor βsˆ


i is no longer significantly
different from 1. Thus, volatility is a possible explanation of over-saving.14
13The effect on saving of uncertainty may in general be ambiguous. In, however, the present experiment
an increase in the uncertainty about the rate of inflation (interpreted in the sense of a Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970) mean preserving spread) implies higher savings. To see this, let the individual’s beliefs about the
value of the price ratio pi be summarised by a non-degenerate cumulative distribution function F = Aa@ over a
closed interval b pi c pid , with pi e 0. The subject’s problem is then to choose S so as to
max f
pi
pi
= ω1 ? S @ ω2 D
S
pi
dF = pi @
The first order condition for an interior solution yields:
S ; 1
2
ω1 ?
1
E b 1 < pid
ω2
where the expectation is taken with respect to F . Clearly, if the subject has a point expectation about pi,
there is no uncertainty as assumed by the theoretical model of section 2 and the optimal decision is given
by equation 5. If, however, F = Aa@ is non-degenerate, then, given that for a generic random variable X it
is E b 1 < X dhg 1 < E b X diD σ2X <B= E b X dj@ 3 (where σ2X is the variance of X), it straightforwardly follows that the
greater the uncertainty about the rate of inflation, the higher must be the saving in the experiment.
14We have estimated the two regimes separately and found that the resulting coefficients are not signifi-
cantly different.
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si


t  βsˆ


isˆi


t
 βν˙orν˙or β σβ t P  Q t Q 95% conf. interval
βsˆ


i 1.000082 .0009147 1093.322 0.000 .9982887 1.001875
βν˙or .0004563 .0003373 1.353 0.176 -.0002049 .0011175
Table 4: Volatility explains part of the over-saving
6 Theoretical and policy implications of over-saving
Having presented the results mechanically, we now discuss in more detail how they can be
interpreted and what can be learned from them. Summarising the macro evidence, while
we find some support for Friedman’s conjecture that the money growth rule generates less
inflation volatility than the constant real deficit rule, we also find an unexpected trade-off
between the two rules: the money growth rule produces more average inflation and less
average saving than the real deficit rule.
There are two possible explanations of this latter effect at micro level. One is that the
monetary regimes affect the average saving level which in turn would be responsible for
the different level of inflation. Alternatively, perhaps the average level of saving is not
affected by the monetary regimes, while the different monetary regimes yield different
inflation levels given the same behaviour. We find little support for the first hypothesis:
while we observe over-saving under both regimes (and the saving regressions confirm
that there is no systematic difference between the two in the amount of over-saving), we
have inflation below the equilibrium level only under the constant real deficit rule, but not
under the constant money growth rule.
This result gives independent support for the second hypothesis. Clearly, constant
over-saving leads to inflation rates lower than the equilibrium values under the constant
real deficit regime, but will not affect inflation at all under the money growth rule: rewrit-
ing equations 6 and 7 of section 2 and assuming constant saving behaviour st  st  1  s
yields
pi 
µs
s

d (22)
With the money growth regime (d  0), the inflation rate is µ when the saving level is con-
stant over time. With the constant real deficit regime (d  0) the inflation rate decreases
in s.
Thus, persistent over-saving, which our regressions have shown to be mainly pre-
cautionary, might be the reason for the different inflation levels observed under the two
regimes in the experiments. Even more importantly, we will now show that also the differ-
ence in the inflation volatility of the two regimes is perhaps due to the same phenomenon
of over-saving.
To this end, let us consider a linear model of over-saving and change equation 4 as
follows:
st  γ  2ζ12 ω
1

pt  1
pt
ω2 (23)
A rational agent, in a world of no-uncertainty, would (as in equation 4) choose γ  0 and
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ζ  1

2; a purely over-saving agent might choose γ  0 or ζ  1

2; an agent who further
saves a convex combination of past saving and best reply might choose γ  0 and ζ  1

2.
The equilibrium map (see equation 8) is now:

d  γ  ζω1

ζpiet  1ω2  µ

γ  ζω1

ζpiet ω2 
pit
 0 (24)
Assuming first-order adaptive learning, and following the same procedure of integration
and linearisation applied through equations 13 to 14 of section 2, we can study the local
stability properties of the two monetary rules in the experiment. As in section 2, with
complex eigenvalues, stability depends on the contraction factor:
piαω2
γ
ζ
 ω1

piω2
(25)
where pi is the inflation rate observed in the experiment.
The greater this expression, the more likely the system is to be stable. Since this
expression does not depend on the parameters of the two monetary rules one might argue
that the rules should not lead to different volatility of inflation.
With over-saving, however, this result is no longer correct. Since, as we have seen in
particular in equation 22, over-saving leads to lower inflation levels under the real deficit
regime, but not under the money growth regime, the different levels of inflation under the
two regimes can also explain their different volatility.
We would also emphasise that this trade-off between the two monetary rules we find
in the experiment may not be trivial from a policy perspective. The two regimes, be-
ing designed to be theoretically equivalent in terms of government revenues in a world
with no-uncertainty and rational agents, are still equivalent in the experiment, despite
the deviations from the theoretical predictions we have observed. With the constant real
deficit regime the inflation level is lower than equilibrium, but this cannot influence the
revenues, since they are by definition constant under this regime. Conversely, the exper-
imental properties of the constant money growth regime are ‘similar’ to the equilibrium
properties: the inflation level is on average very close to the equilibrium, so that we should
expect the government revenues to be close to the equilibrium as well.
This intuition is confirmed by the cumulative distributions of the government revenues
under the two regimes (figure 12). We see that both regimes yield, on the average, similar
government revenues, and can thus be considered equivalent not only in equilibrium, but
also in the experiment.
We finally note that while on the one hand the evidence we have reported might be
considered to support Friedman’s conjecture on the lower volatility of inflation under the
money growth rule, on the other hand it contrasts with a second conjecture also advanced
by Friedman in his Nobel Lecture (Friedman 1977). There he suggested that a positive
relationship exists between the level of inflation and the volatility of future inflation rates,
the so-called inflation-uncertainty hypothesis. This conjecture has spawned a very gen-
eral, but not conclusive empirical literature. For example, as noted by Evans (1991):
“Although economists have long suspected that inflation rates and inflation uncertainty
are tightly linked, the statistical evidence is surprisingly ambiguous”. Our results may
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Revenues are normalised to 1 in the low ISS. The vertical line at 1 shows the constant real deficit regime,
the curved line shows the money growth regime.
Figure 12: Cumulative distribution of government revenues
help to explain why. Friedman advanced his second conjecture in a context of uncertainty
of the monetary regime, rather than in a context of comparison between regimes: “A burst
of inflation produces strong pressure to counter it. Policy goes from one direction to the
other, encouraging wide variation in the actual and anticipated rate of inflation” (Fried-
man, 1977, pp. 466). Our evidence and the analysis conducted above, however, show that
even when the regimes are certain there may still be an important, though more subtle,
source of endogenous uncertainty, affecting agents’ behaviours and the actual inflation
rates, through the stability properties of the adaptive dynamics of the different regimes.
7 Concluding remarks on the literature of adaptive
learning
The last observation of the previous section brings us to consider an ultimate, more
general question underlying our experimental investigation and concerning the extent to
which, as in some current research (see the comprehensive survey in Evans and Honkapo-
hja (1999)), different monetary policies can be studied and possibly ranked according to
the stability properties of their adaptive dynamics.
The answer provided by our evidence is not simple. On the one hand, from an ex ante
position, considering that the theoretical stability properties of the two monetary rules we
study imply equivalence of the two regimes, we should reject stability analysis because
inconsistent with our observation. From an ex post position, however, after rejecting the
equivalence hypothesis on empirical grounds, we have used stability analysis — in the
light of the observed deviations from optimal saving decisions — to explain the different
inflationary impacts of the rules.
Should the ex ante- or the ex post- perspective be preferred? The answer depends on
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the aims of the analysis. If the purpose of the analysis is to understand and to describe
what one observes in the data, our experiments clearly confirm that the theory of adaptive
learning may be quite fruitful. If instead one wishes to derive policy recommendations
simply by the theoretical stability properties of alternative policy options, much more
caution should be used. Attention must in particular be paid to the possible effects of the
large number of issues which, unavoidably, a theoretical model must abstract from; but
which, if taken into account, may affect the conclusion of stability analysis substantially.
This seems an obvious consideration, valid for any of theoretically-based policy rec-
ommendation. But in the present case, it assumes a special importance. We in partic-
ular emphasise that the question we are addressing is not the reliability of the theory
of adaptive learning in its final implications for equilibrium selection; but the extent to
which adaptive learning can also be useful in an ex ante perspective, to anticipate fully
the dynamic transitional aspects out of an equilibrium. It is this much more subtle issue,
which is causing much debate among macroeconomists (e.g. Sargent (1993), Honkapohja
(Honkapohja 1995), Farmer (1996)).
The problem seems to be that “the environments into which we have cast our adaptive
agents seem much more stable and hospitable than the real life situations for which we
would want transition dynamics” (Sargent (1993, p. 169)). An important specific diffi-
culty seems to be that the environments in which adaptive agents are normally embedded
typically refer to general equilibrium economies where there is no uncertainty. While this
assumption could perhaps be justified in models of rational expectations (since, by defini-
tion, in such models the economy is always in equilibrium) a characteristic of the models
of adaptive learning is precisely that the actual law of motion of the forecasted variables
differ, during the transitional process, from the perceived law of motion, so giving rise
to an obvious source of endogenous uncertainty. In this respect, we would conclude by
noting that among the different factors one may have to consider in future research to
increase the robustness of monetary policy recommendations based on stability analysis,
special efforts should be made to check how robust the recommendations are, in view of
the effect that endogenous inflation uncertainty may have on agents’ behaviours.
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A LIST OF EXPERIMENTS 26
A List of experiments
Experiments run in Florence 5/97
n Players Session Periods Label d ; 167
160
A ω1
1 12 1 13 EC 0 600
1 12 2 11 Euro-Bank 1 600
1 12 3 7 EC 0 600
2 6 1 14 EC 0 480
2 6 2 12 Euro-Bank 1 480
Experiments run in Mannheim 12/97
n Players Session Periods Label d ; 167
160
A ω1
3 17 1 21 — 0 480
3 17 2 12 — 1 480
3 17 3 17 — 0 480
3 17 4 5 — 1 480
4 13 1 15 BuBa 1 480
4 13 2 17 EC 0 480
4 13 3 16 BuBa 1 480
4 13 4 15 EC 1 480
5 16 1 24 BuBa 0 600
5 16 2 28 BuBa 0 600
5 16 3 59 EC 0 600
6 15 1 19 EC 1 900
6 15 2 14 BuBa 0 900
6 15 3 19 EC 1 900
7 20 1 23 EC 1 750
7 20 2 43 BuBa 0 750
7 20 3 18 EC 1 750
8 19 1 19 — 0 600
8 19 2 55 — 1 600
Experiments run in Pavia 4/98
n Players Session Periods Label d ; 167
160
A ω1
9 14 1 24 BuBa 1 480
9 14 2 15 BuBa 0 480
9 14 3 10 BuBa 1 480
9 14 4 15 BuBa 0 480
10 14 1 7 EC 1 900
10 14 2 19 EC 1 900
10 14 3 9 EC 1 900
11 13 1 21 EC 1 540
11 13 2 21 BuBa 0 540
11 13 3 8 EC 1 540
12 14 1 21 EC 0 750
12 14 2 8 EC 0 750
12 14 3 7 EC 0 750
12 14 4 21 BuBa 1 750
13 14 1 24 BuBa 1 750
13 14 2 10 BuBa 1 750
13 14 3 22 EC 0 750
